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Abstract: Governments can intervene to a greater or lesser extent in managing the risks that citizens face. They can 
adopt a maximal intervention approach (e.g., COVID-19) or a hands-off approach (e.g., unemployment), effectively 
“responsibilizing” their citizens. To manage the cyber risk, governments publish cyber-related policies. This article 
examines the intervention stances the governments adopt in supporting individual citizens managing their personal 
cyber risk. The authors pinpoint the cyber-related responsibilities that several governments espouse, applying a 
“responsibilization” analysis. Those applying to citizens are identified, thereby revealing the governments’ cyber-related 
intervention stances. The analysis reveals that most governments adopt a minimal cyber-related intervention stance in 
supporting their citizens. Given the increasing number of successful cyber attacks on individuals, it seems time for the 
consequences of this stance to be acknowledged and reconsidered. The authors argue that governments should support 
individual citizens more effectively in dealing with cyber threats.
Evidence for Practice
•	 National	cyber	security	policies	assign	a	range	of	responsibilities	for	cyber	security	actions	to	different	
stakeholders.
•	 Governments	embrace	and	accept	responsibilities	ranging	from	dealing	with	cyber	criminals	and	protecting	
government	assets	to	strengthening	international	collaboration	with	other	countries.
•	 When	it	comes	to	individual	citizens,	the	Five	Eyes	governments	(United	Kingdom,	United	States,	Canada,	
Australia,	and	New	Zealand)	generally	offer	advice	and	related	services	and	then	relegate	the	task	of	
managing	cyber	attacks	to	individual	citizens.	They	offer	very	little	direct	support,	in	stark	contrast	with	the	
range	of	services	and	funding	offered	to	businesses	and	to	support	research.
The	huge	advantages	that	global	citizens	gain	from	being	online	are	somewhat	clouded	by	the	significant	risks	they	are	exposed	to	while	
utilizing	online	services	(de	Bruijn	and	Janssen	2017).	
Cyber	attacks	have	become	an	everyday	occurrence,	
with	cyber	criminals	even	exploiting	pandemics	to	attack	
people	worldwide	(Gatlan	2020).	During	February	2020,	
for	example,	a	total	of	623	million	data	records	were	
breached	during	cyber	attacks	(Irwin	2020).	In	2018,	the	
World	Economic	Forum	ranked	cyber	attacks	third	in	
worldwide	threats	(World	Economic	Forum	2018).
Cyber	criminals	may	target	nations	or	societies	(such	as	
interference	with	elections),	organizations	(such	as	the	
Sony	and	Stuxnet	attacks),	or	individuals	(i.e.,	private	
internet	users	or	“netizens”;	see	Zhu,	Huang,	and	
Zhang	2019).	Citizens	experience	malicious	assaults	
on	their	information	security	in	the	form	of	phishing	
attempts,	malware,	malicious	state	actors,	and	the	
actions	of	other	motivated	and	resourceful	individuals	
who	seek	to	steal	or	corrupt	their	information	or	to	
defraud	them	(Nichols	2019;	Xavier	and	Pati	2012).
Organizations	and	governments	deploy	a	range	of	
technical	tools	to	improve	their	own	cyber	security	
and	to	repel	attacks,	and	they	allocate	significant	
funds	to	this	activity	(Singh	et	al.	2013).	Yet	
Norris,	Joshi,	and	Finin	(2015)	point	out	that	the	
major	problem	is	actually	humans	in	the	system	
making	mistakes	or	omissions,	thereby	unwittingly	
aiding	cyber	attackers.	Governments	and	
organizations	can,	and	do,	employ	professionals	to	
deliver	regular	security	training	to	their	employees,	
and	information	technology	(IT)	staff	provide	
advice	and	assist	in	recovery	from	incidents.	
Individual	citizens,	on	the	other	hand,	seldom	
have	access	to	this	kind	of	expert	training	or	
funding,	nor	do	they	necessarily	even	realize	that	
they	are	at	risk	(Mustafa	and	Kar	2019;	Nthala	
and	Flechais	2017).	This	means	that	citizens	
across	the	globe	are	particularly	vulnerable,	as	
soft	targets	fall	victim	to	devastating	cyber	attacks	
(ABC7	Chicago	2017;	Hughes	2020;	Kubiak	2020;	
Nichols	2019;	Selby	2019;	Wang	2018;	
WTVR	2019).
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Nye	(2011),	in	contemplating	the	lessons	that	the	nuclear	industry	
has	for	the	cyber	security	field,	makes	the	point	that	both	fields	
suffer	from	the	fact	that	civilian	uses	complicate	national	security	
strategies.	As	mentioned	before,	average	citizens	might	well	leave	
themselves	open	to	attack	out	of	ignorance,	fear,	or	a	lack	of	
requisite	skills.	There	are	a	number	of	ways	that	governments	can	
address	this	kind	of	situation.	Their	actions	can	range	from	strongly	
interventionist,	whereby	they	legislate	specific	actions	and	punish	
noncompliance,	to	relatively	hands-off	provision	of	advice.	There	
are	also	gradations	between	these	two	extremes,	but	the	hands-
off	approach	is	often	referred	to	as	responsibilization	of	citizens.	
Shamir	(2018,	4)	writes	that	responsibilization	is	“a	call	for	action;	
an	interpellation	which	constructs	and	assumes	a	moral	agency	and	
certain	dispositions	to	social	action	that	necessarily	follows.”
In	considering	this	question	for	a	range	of	noncyber	issues,	Tsinovoi	
and	Adler-Nissen	(2018,	3)	explain	that	“the	‘duty	of	care’	earlier	
embraced	by	many	governments	has	now	been	supplanted	with	
a	mind-set	of	‘citizens	as	resources.’”	Whereas	governments	
previously	sought	to	act	as	shepherds	protecting	their	flocks,	with	
citizens	being	passive	recipients	of	such	protection,	citizens	in	
neoliberal-led	countries,	in	particular,	are	now	seen	as	active	forces	
to	be	mobilized	to	take	care	of	themselves—that	is,	responsibilized.	
Instead	of	embracing	their	erstwhile	duty	of	care,	governments	now	
focus	on	building	capabilities	(Tsinovoi	and	Adler-Nissen	2018).	
Responsibilization	can	be	seen	as	a	reduction	of	direct	government	
intervention	with	respect	to	a	particular	issue,	trending	toward	
less	intervention,	with	gradations	similar	to	those	suggested	by	
Assaf	(2008).	For	matters	that	governments	judge	merit	minimal	
intervention,	responsibilized	citizens	are	provided	with	advice	and	
perhaps	on-demand	services	and	then	are	expected	to	take	full	
responsibility	for	managing	those	matters.	They	subsequently	face	
the	consequences	if	they	do	not	follow	the	government’s	advice.
This	responsibilization	concept	was	first	mentioned	in	relation	to	
cyber	security	in	an	article	by	Harknett	and	Stever	(2009),	in	which	
they	offer	analysis	of	federal	reorganization	attempts	juxtaposing	
recent	advances	in	technology	to	those	of	nuclear	technology.	
The	authors	call	for	“cybersecurity	to	rest	on	a	balanced	triad	
of	intergovernmental	relations,	private	corporate	involvement,	
and	active	cyber	citizenship	as	a	resilient	model	that	can	manage	
this	new	and	challenging	security	environment”	(Harknett	and	
Stever	2009,	1).
Building	on	these	foundational	efforts,	this	article	seeks	to	
reveal	the	extent	to	which	citizens	of	selected	countries	are	being	
responsibilized	when	it	comes	to	cyber	security—that	is,	what	level	
of	intervention	is	envisaged	by	the	governments	in	question.	In	this	
article,	we	investigate	six	governments’	intervention	stances	in	terms	
of	supporting	their	citizens	in	the	cyber	realm.
We	analyzed	the	six	countries’	cyber	security	strategy	policies,	
seeking	to	highlight	the	implicit	intervention	stances	that	inform	
cyber	threat	management	within	the	policies.	Policies	are	indeed	
a	viable	artifact	to	analyze,	because,	as	Väljataga	(2018)	argues,	
“National	cyber	security	strategies	serve	as	useful	tool	to	identify	
a	state’s	general	position	in	regard	to	the	rules	and	principles	
in	cyberspace.”	To	extract	responsibilities	from	statements	in	
policies,	we	utilized	the	problematization	approach	formulated	by	
Bacchi	(2009,	2012).	We	then	classified	each	responsibility	with	
respect	to	how	it	reflects	the	specific	government’s	intervention	
stance,	using	Assaf’s	(2008)	intervention	categorization.
In	the	next	section,	we	review	the	evolution	of	cyber	policy	in	
public	administration	to	contextualize	our	research.	We	then	
explain	how	we	used	Bacchi’s	problematization	approach	to	
formulate	a	set	of	responsibilization	questions	to	guide	this	research.	
We	report	on	each	step	and	conclude	that	citizens	are	generally	
responsibilized	to	manage	their	own	cyber	protection	by	the	Five	
Eyes	countries	(United	Kingdom,	United	States,	Canada,	Australia,	
and	New	Zealand),	while	China	exercises	more	monitoring	of	
individual	behaviors.	The	implicit	assumption	by	the	Five	Eyes	
countries	appears	to	be	that	their	citizens	will	be	able	to	resist	cyber	
threats	without	direct	support,	if	only	enough	advice	and	guidance	
is	provided.	In	effect,	these	governments	fully	responsibilize	their	
citizens	in	dealing	with	cyber	security	threats.
We	conclude	the	article	by	suggesting	that	the	implicit	assumption	
underlying	this	responsibilization	of	citizens	is,	in	fact,	misguided.	
We	argue	that	the	Five	Eyes	governments	ought	to	rethink	their	
cyber	responsibilization	stance.
Cyber Policy in Public Administration
Beginning	with	the	early	work	of	Kraemer	and	Dutton	(1978),	
and	since	the	publication	in	1986	of	a	special	issue	of	Public 
Administration Review	about	public	management	information	
systems,	both	academics	and	practitioners	have	focused	on	the	
impact	of	IT	in	the	public	sector	arena	(Bretschneider	1990;	
Caudle	1990;	Northrop	et	al.	1990).	Early	work	sought	insights	
into	the	use	of	IT	by	government	agencies	for	internal	operational	
needs	(Nedovic-Budic	and	Godschalk	1996;	Norris	and	
Kraemer	1996;	Ventura	1995).
E-Government Emergence
As	time	progressed,	the	birth	and	rapid	expansion	of	the	internet	
prompted	a	research	focus	on	electronic	government	(e-government)	
as	a	newly	emergent	platform	enabling	governments	across	the	
globe	to	deliver	cost-effective	and	convenient	services	to	citizens,	
private	sector	organizations,	employees,	and	other	nongovernmental	
agencies	(Ho	2002;	Moon	2002;	Norris	and	Jae	Moon	2005;	
West	2004).	As	e-government	became	more	firmly	established,	
scholars	pursued	both	descriptive	and	comparative	research,	
focusing	on	models	and	rates	of	adoption,	as	well	as	evaluating	
service	value	and	user	approval	(Coursey	and	Norris	2008;	Lee,	
Chang,	and	Berry	2011;	Norris	and	Reddick	2013).	Over	recent	
years,	the	culture	of	innovation	that	IT	fostered	in	the	public	sector	
(Desouza	and	Bhagwatwar	2012)	has	generated	fresh	avenues	of	
study	centered	on	the	expansive	growth	of	social	media.
The Dark Side of the Internet
The	rise	of	the	internet,	and	of	a	truly	worldwide	user	community,	
has	ushered	in	an	era	of	unanticipated	societal	risks	with	an	ever-
expanding	set	of	interactive	tools	utilized	to	advance	electronic	
transactions	(AlDairi	and	Tawalbeh	2017;	Andreasson	2011;	
Cordes	2010;	Goodyear	et	al.	2010;	Harknett	and	Stever	2011;	
Zhao	and	Zhao	2010).	This	vast	and	evolving	expanse	of	
technology	connectivity	has	paved	the	way	for	cyber	attacks	
to	become	a	contemporary	reality	for	citizens	across	the	globe	
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(Parshall	2018).	Moreover,	several	concerns	have	been	raised	over	
privacy	violations	(Caruson,	MacManus,	and	McPhee	2012).
Cyber Security Challenge
Cyber	security	has	become	a	complex	and	vexing	challenge	of	the	
twenty-first	century	(Harknett	and	Stever	2011),	with	governments	
often	under	almost	continual	cyber	attack	(Norris	et	al.	2019).	De	
Bruijn	and	Janssen	(2017,	1)	note	that	“interest	in	cyber	security	
issues	often	focuses	on	incidents	and	how	to	deal	with	them	after	
the	fact,	while	a	concern	for	prevention	and	investments	in	better	
cyber	security	have	lagged	behind.”	The	rapid	rise	of	cyber	security,	
as	a	global	issue,	has	buttressed	the	argument	for	the	protection	of	
corporations	and	individuals	from	the	untoward	use	of	the	internet	
by	illicit	actors.	Authors	and	academics	have,	in	recent	years,	called	
for	multistakeholder	internet	governance	(Kuehn	2014),	given	
the	rising	concern	for	national	security	as	a	key	consideration	in	
the	formulation	of	public	policy.	Evolving	and	advancing	cyber	
security	challenges	persist	and	plague	nations	and	individual	
citizens.	The	governance	of	cyber	security	is	fixed	as	a	crucial	
element	contributing	to	the	security	of	a	nation	(Christensen	and	
Petersen	2017;	Hathaway	and	Stewart	2014;	Kello	2013).	Kuerbis	
and	Badiei	(2017)	note	that	the	governance	of	cyber	security	is	
disposed	to	nationalization,	described	as	a	mingling	of	homeland	
and	societal	cyber	security.
Cyber Security Policy
Cyber	security	policy	has	become	inextricably	linked	to	internet	
governance,	and,	as	argued	by	Mueller	(2017),	cyber	security–
centric	dialogue	has	come	to	overshadow	the	advance	of	internet	
governance.	While	advancing	the	notion	that	national	and	societal	
cyber	security	should	be	differentiated,	Mueller	(2017)	argues	
equally	for	an	interlocking	compatibility.	Crucial	in	the	quickening	
development	of	policy	and	governance	models	for	both	cyber	
security	and	the	internet	is	the	coercive	potential	of	illicit	actors	
and	the	interstate	power	shifts	inherent	in	the	modern	global	
information	age	(Nye	2015).	The	intersection	of	unprecedented	
technological	advances,	politics,	and	national	security	concerns	has	
fueled	intense	deliberation	regarding	the	suitable	responsibility	of	
nation-states	in	both	international	cyber	security	policy	and	internet	
governance	(Shackelford	and	Craig	2014).
Collaboration and Cooperation
Over	the	last	two	decades,	it	has	become	clear	that	
intergovernmental	and	interjurisdictional	cooperation	is	required	
to	address	society’s	most	pressing	threats,	such	as	counterterrorism	
(Kincaid	and	Cole	2002).	Elazar	(1990)	proposed	a	blended	concept	
of	cooperation	and	coercion	that	offers	a	framework	for	describing	
the	nature	and	pattern	of	this	type	of	intergovernmental	relations.	
Under	such	circumstances,	the	center	of	policy	responsibility,	
authority,	and	power	may	shift	from	state	and	local	governments	
to	the	national	government,	and	a	pattern	of	regulatory	(coercive)	
intergovernmental	relations	may	transpire	(Cho	and	Wright	2004).	
Cyber	security	policy	and	internet	governance	as	offensive	measures	
to	protect	a	nation	and	its	citizens	and	businesses	from	cyber	risks	
may	substantiate	a	highly	federalized	system	yet	still	compel	an	
intergovernmentalized	strategy	to	minimize	harm	and	disruption.	
While	the	debate	as	to	whether	these	intergovernmental	relations	
regarding	cyber	security	should	be	cooperative,	coercive,	or	a	
convergence	of	the	two,	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research.	The	
implications	for	initiatives	and	changes	these	may	impose	on	the	
federal	system	certainly	warrant	exploration	in	future	study.
While	individual	nations	have	developed	and	circulated	unique	
national	cyber	security	strategies,	which	vary	in	domestic	focal	
points	and	methods	(Luiijf,	Besseling,	and	de	Graaf	2013),	
numerous	countries	and	international	bodies	have	also	pursued	
common	ground,	forging	mutual	obligations	on	cyber	security	
through	the	Draft	International	Code	of	Conduct	for	Information	
Security	(Lkhagvasuren	2017).
Cyber Power
Even	with	efforts	to	develop	cyber	security	policy	and	governance	
across	a	myriad	of	sectors,	the	academic	literature	addressing	
governance	constructs	is	limited.1	Cyber	power	as	a	contextual	
model	(Christou	2017)	is	rooted	in	the	pragmatic	need	to	safeguard	
technology	and	telecommunication	assets	from	the	rising	tide	
of	global	cyber	risks	(Senol	2017).	This	continually	expanding	
information	and	communication	infrastructure,	often	privately	
owned	and	operated	(Carr	2016;	Farrand	and	Carrapico	2018),	
provides	a	vast	array	of	electronic	services	and	transactions	and	has	
become	a	potent	force	in	cyber	warfare	(Senol	2017).
Cyber	security	policy	development	is	firmly	coupled	with	the	
securing	of	critical	technology	infrastructure,	often	affecting	nation-
state	power	dispersement	(Valeriano	and	Maness	2018),	as	well	as	
inciting	rivalry	for	economic	gain	and	influence	over	all	aspects	of	
the	internet	(Hathaway	2014).	With	the	contextual	underpinning	
of	cyber	power,	the	safeguarding	of	cyber	space	and	the	mitigation	
of	cyber	risk	have	become	top	security	priorities	for	nations	globally,	
with	policy	focus	in	three	arenas:	cyber	crime,	critical	information	
infrastructures,	and	cyber	defense	(Farrand	and	Carrapico	2018).	
Cyber	power,	as	a	predominant	ingredient	in	cyber	security	policy	
development,	informs	views	on	the	propensity	for	cyber	war,	
with	the	internet	once	again	the	focal	point	of	nationalistic	power	
struggles	(Gartzke	2013;	Glaser	and	Kaufmann	1998;	Rid	2012).	
Table	1	provides	a	snapshot	of	approaches	to	cyber	security	
scholarship,	as	cited	in	Christou	(2017).
Cyber Policies as Governance Indicator
Nye	(2014)	maintains	that	previous	research	has	utilized	the	lens	
of	regime	theory	as	a	method	for	elucidating	complex	international	
Table 1 Approaches to Cyber Security Scholarship, as Cited in Christou (2017)
Research Approaches Academic Literature
Traditional national strategic 
and managerial
Libicki (2007, 2009); Clarke and Knake (2010)
Historical Carr (2009)
Terrorist-oriented Wiemann (2006); Colarik (2006)
Governance (regulatory) Mueller (2010); Brown and Marsden (2007)
Pragmatic, eclectic, comparative Karatzogianni (2004, 2009); Eriksson and 
Giacomello (2010
Innovative mixed method Deibert et al. (2011)
Securitized Cavelty (2007, 2008); Bendrath, Eriksson, and 
Giacomello (2007)
Cyber power Klimburg and Tiirmaa-Klaar (2011); Betz 
and Stevens (2011); Klimburg (2011); 
Nye (2010); Kramer, Starr, and Wentz (2009)
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governance	processes,	thus	providing	a	use	case	related	to	cyber	
governance.	Other	scholarship	has	employed	similar	approaches,	
utilizing	the	homeland	security	policy	regime	(May,	Jochim,	
and	Sapotichne	2011)	and	risk	regimes	(Quigley	and	Roy	2012)	
consistently	with	the	goal	of	progressing	policy	regimes	that	
concentrate	policy	making	on	a	collective	goal	across	diverse	
subsystems.	Nye	(2014,	19)	concludes	that	“internet	governance	is	
the	application	by	governments,	the	private	sector	and	civil	society	
of	principles,	norms,	rules,	procedures	and	programs	that	shape	
the	evolution	and	use	of	the	Internet.”	Other	recent	research	has	
proposed	that	the	citizenry	has,	in	effect,	become	responsibilized—
that	cyber	risk	is	individualized,	thus	contributing	to	the	expansive	
spread	and	efficacy	of	cyber	attacks	(Hadjimatheou	2019;	Renaud	
et	al.	2018).
As	noted	by	Harknett	and	Stever	(2011,	455–456),	the	“cyber	
security	problem	does	not	fit	conventional	or	traditional	security	
categories	based	on	individual	security	responsibilities,	economic	
or	corporate	security	issues,	military	security	problems,	as	well	
as	domestic	versus	international	problems.”	The	struggle,	in	
determining	the	origins	and	impacts	of	a	cyber	attack,	is	“generally	
approached	as	a	technical	challenge	for	security	professionals	and	
politicians”	(Schulzke	2018,	954).	Schulzke	(2018)	argues	that	
attributional	challenges	can	affect	a	citizen’s	ability	to	cognize	
security	challenges	as	well	as	evaluate	government	actions;	this	
ambiguity	often	leaves	citizens	repeatedly	missing	the	required	
information	to	ascertain	dependably	the	attack	perpetrators.	
Schulzke	(2018,	954)	presents	that	“attributional	uncertainty	
immediately	following	cyber	attacks	encourages	dependence	on	a	
narrow	range	of	elite	frames	and	the	assignment	of	blame	to	familiar	
enemies.”
Citizen Responsibilization
Citing	the	paradox	in	the	current	policy-making	environment	(de	
Bruijn	and	Janssen	2017),	as	well	as	other	authors	suggesting	the	
murky	pitfalls	of	attribution	(Schulzke	2018),	recent	scholars	have	
called	for	the	framing	of	cyber	security	dialogue.	Some	have	raised	
concerns	about	the	apparent	responsibilization	of	individuals	for	
cyber	security,	comparing	it	with	stances	related	to	similar	societal	
contagion-type	risks	such	as	disease	and	fire	(Renaud	et	al.	2018).
Responsibilization	may	lead	to	the	flawed	conclusion	that	those	
who	do	not	manage	the	risk,	as	they	are	expected	to,	deserve	
whatever	outcomes	that	might	ensue	and	that	these	unlucky	
individuals	would	then	be	stigmatized	by	their	victimhood	
(Ekendahl,	Mansson,	and	Karlsson	2018).	The	work	of	Quigley	
and	Roy	(2012,	83)	most	closely	aligns	with	the	precepts	of	
responsibilization,	employing	an	“anthropological	understanding	
of	risk	in	order	to	examine	public	sector	action	and	capacity	with	
respect	to	the	multidimensional	challenge	of	cyber	security.”
The	aim	of	this	article	is	to	uncover	the	extent	of	cyber	security	
responsibilization	of	individual	citizens	by	six	selected	governments,	
as	revealed	by	their	own	cyber	security	strategy	policies.
Revealing Responsibilities and Intervention Stances
Governments’	cyber	security	strategy	policies	are	useful	in	revealing	
the	mind-sets	of	governments	in	shaping	cyber	security	provision	
and	resilience.	Evaluation	of	these	policies	can	provide	insights	
regarding	what	governments	consider	the	roles	of	the	citizen	
and	organizations	to	be,	as	well	as	the	intervention	stance	that	
governments	adopt	in	considering	the	responsibilities	of	different	
stakeholders.	The	policy	documents	explain	how	governments	say	
they	will	direct	their	efforts	and,	in	some	cases,	allocate	funding.	
Citing	Doty	(2015),	de	Bruijn	and	Janssen	(2017)	note	that	
articulating	a	clear	and	concise	message	regarding	cyber	security	
policy	is	an	onerous	undertaking,	one	fraught	with	the	task	of	
conceptualizing	future	threats	in	a	tactile	manner	without	fostering	
a	“fictionalization	that	might	create	a	climate	of	fear”	(Doty	2015,	
342).	The	realm	of	cyber	security	is	one	of	technical	specialization	
and	expertise	that	requires	precise	message	framing,	an	approach	for	
transmitting	a	complex	civic	issue	with	exactness	and	clarity.	The	
crafting	of	cyber	security	policy	often	seeks	lucidness	in	a	division	
of	labor	regarding	who	bears	different	cyber	responsibilities	and	the	
extent	to	which	they	are	supported	in	acting	on	these.	Yet	thus	far,	
there	seems	to	be	no	clear	idea	of	exactly	what	the	responsibilities	of	
each	stakeholder	are	or	how	they	ought	to	be	allocated	(de	Bruijn	
and	Janssen	2017).
Uncovering	the	underlying	assumptions	that	drive	the	formulation	
of	cyber	security	policies	is	essential	because	these	assumptions	
about	ability,	confidence,	and	expertise	to	act	reflect	the	cyber	
responsibilities	that	governments	think	entities	ought	to	be	
embracing.	Understanding	these	is	important,	because	governments	
accept	and	allocate	responsibility	based	on	their	conceptualization	of	
the	cyber	security	issue.	If	underlying	self-efficacy	assumptions	are	
flawed,	responsibilities	might	well	be	misaligned.	Responsibilized	
parties	may	be	unwilling,	or	unable,	to	accept	and	enact	actions	
commensurate	with	implicitly	assigned	responsibilities.
Methodology
Our	research	uses	a	method	extrapolated	from	an	approach	
called	problematizing	(Bacchi	2009,	2012)	to	focus	on	the	
way	responsibility	is	apportioned	in	the	cyber	security	arena.	
Problematization	is	a	rigorous	and	formalized	way	of	revealing	
assumptions	and	critiquing	solutions	based	on	implicit	problem	
conceptualizations.	In	our	analysis,	the	extrapolation	of	Bacchi’s	
problematization	process	to	meet	our	analysis	needs	is	referred	to	
as	a	responsibilization analysis.	This	analysis	poses	six	questions,	
analogous	to	Bacchi’s	problematization	questions,	to	determine	
what	the	cyber	responsibilities	are	and	how	they	are	currently	
allocated	to	citizens,	organizations,	and	government—that	is,	
what	levels	of	intervention	governments	embrace	in	the	cyber	
domain.	We	then	consider	these	allocations	and	how	the	adopted	
intervention	stances	may	be	suboptimal.	Our	final	question	
considers	how	the	approach	could	be	questioned	and	conceptualized	
differently.	Figure	1	depicts	the	responsibilization	analysis	questions	
that	were	used	during	our	analysis	process	and	shows	how	these	
map	to	Bacchi’s	(2009,	2012)	problematization	questions.
Intervention Stances
To	visualize	the	policy	differences	and	similarities,	we	classified	
each	responsibility	in	terms	of	intervention	stance,	similar	to	the	
scheme	proposed	by	Assaf	(2008).	Responsibilities	were	categorized	
as	follows:
Government (Gi)	(maximal	intervention):	These	are	responsibilities	
that	are	fully	embraced	by	the	government,	where	no	specific	
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stakeholder	is	mentioned.	Examples	are	“manage	and	mitigate	
cyber	threats,”	“engage	internationally—laws,	understanding,	
cooperation,	info	sharing,”	and	“secure	public	sector	organizations	
and	infrastructures.”
Monitor (Mi)	(delegated	intervention):	Responsibilities	include	the	
words	“ensure,”	“monitor,”	“hold	.	.	.	responsible,”	or	“governance.”	
In	many	cases,	a	specific	stakeholder	is	mentioned—for	example,	
“protect	minors	online.”	Finally,	because	all	activities	related	to	
cyber	criminals	are	delegated	to	law	enforcement	agencies,	which	
report	to	and	are	monitored	by	the	government,	these,	too,	are	
classified	as	“monitor”	responsibilities.
Service (Si)	(less	intervention):	Responsibilities	resulting	in	some	
kind	of	outward-facing	service,	either	explicitly	or	implicitly	
mentioned,	are	included	in	this	category.	Words	indicating	service-
related	responsibilities	are	“establish,”	“develop,”	“improve,”	
“introduce,”	and	“provide”	are	used	with	mention	of	a	specific	
stakeholder.	Examples	are	“improve	skill	sets	of	law	enforcement”	
and	“provide	advice	and	set	standards.”
Voluntary (Vi)	(no	intervention):	These	responsibilities	are	neither	
monitored	nor	supported.	Examples	are	“incentivize	citizens	to	
report	cyber	incidents”	and	“regular	cyber	testing	of	products	by	
organizations.”
Selecting Countries to Analyze
The	first	step	in	this	evaluation	focused	on	deciding	which	
countries’	strategy	policies	to	analyze.	We	chose	to	examine	
countries	that	have,	over	the	last	few	years,	pursued	a	neoliberal	
agenda	with	respect	to	responsibility,	given	that	citizen	
responsibilization	is	associated	with	government	intervention	stance.	
Government	intervention	in	responsibilizing	countries	has	shifted	
from	maximum	to	minimum	within	the	space	of	a	few	years.
To	support	cyber	security	intervention	stance	comparison,	we	thus	
chose	to	analyze	the	cyber	security	policies	published	by	the	Five	Eyes	
countries—the	United	Kingdom	(HM	Government	2016),	the	United	
States	(White	House	2018),	Canada	(Public	Safety	Canada	2018),	
Australia	(Australian	Government	2016),	and	New	Zealand	(New	
Zealand	Government	2015,	2018)—all	of	which	are	considered	to	be	
neoliberal	in	their	government	stance	(Standford	2014;	Weeks	2005),	
with	an	active	responsibilization	agenda	(Kotz	2002).	These	countries	
constitute	the	world’s	most	complete	and	comprehensive	intelligence	
alliance	(Tossini	2017),	meaning	that	their	cyber	security	stance	can	be	
expected	to	be	mature.	We	chose	to	analyze	the	national	cybersecurity	
policy	of	each	country	rather	than	policies	formulated	at	the	individual	
agency	level	because	the	cybersecurity	policies	offer	a	meaningful	basis	
for	comparison,	while	the	countries’	variation	in	size	and	composition	
would	have	made	agency	policy	comparison	infeasible.	To	facilitate	
comparison,	we	also	analyzed	the	policy	of	China	(USITO	2016),	
a	country	that,	according	to	Chomsky	(1999),	is	“the	most	
interventionist	and	price-distorting	government	of	all”—that	is,	it	does	
not	follow	neoliberal	dictates	(Petersen	2018).
In	focusing	on	responsibilization	and	aligned	intervention	stance,	
our	analysis	ought	to	reveal	differences	between	the	policies	of	
China	and	the	neoliberal	Five	Eyes	countries.	If	governments	are	
indeed	responsibilizing	their	citizens	with	respect	to	cyber	security,	
we	should	see	this	reality	reflected	in	these	countries’	policy	
documents.	Our	analysis	will	also	allow	us	to	reveal	how	these	
countries	propose	to	support	their	citizens	in	resisting	cyber	attacks	
and	becoming	cyber	resilient.
The	analysis	was	framed	by	investigations	into	similar	documents	
carried	out	by	Firmin	and	Gilson	(2009)	and	Fitzgerald	and	
Cunningham	(2016)—that	is,	by	formulating	categories	to	use	in	
classifying	statements	and	then	using	those	categories	to	identify	the	
aligned	cyber	security	responsibility.	Statements	in	the	countries’	
cyber	security	strategy	policies	were	analyzed	to	reveal	the	stances	of	
the	governments	with	respect	to	managing	the	cyber	risk.
Question 1: What Are the Responsibilities?
Each	statement	in	policies	was	analyzed,	to	determine	whether	it:
G:	mentioned	the	government	taking	responsibility	for	some	action;
M:	mentioned	government	monitoring	the	actions	of	some	entity	
(citizen/industry)	to	ensure	that	they	embrace	their	responsibility	
for	cyber	security,	to	ensure	that	the	responsibility	is	accepted;
S:	assigned	a	particular	actionable	responsibility	for	cyber	security	to	
a	stakeholder,	such	as	individual	citizens	or	industry,	or	mentions	
some	stakeholder	(e.g.,	citizen/business)	not	accepting,	or	needing	to	
embrace,	a	specific	cyber	security	responsibility	(less	intervention);	or.
V:	mentioned	that	particular	actions	ought	to	be	encouraged	or	
carried	out.
Figure 1 The Responsibilization Analysis Questions (Extrapolated from Bacchi’s [2009] Problematization Questions)
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Generalized	statements	of	responsibility,	without	attendant	
actions	being	expressly	mentioned	or	implied,	did	not	result	in	
identification	of	a	responsibility.	For	example,	the	statement	from	
the	Chinese	translation,	“The	network	affairs	within	the	sovereignty	
of	each	country	are	the	responsibility	of	the	people	of	each	country,”	
does	not	meet	the	actionable	requirement.	Another	statement	from	
the	same	policy,	“Encourage	citizens	to	report	cyber	violations	
and	bad	information,”	aligns	with	the	last	category	(V)	and	thus	is	
counted	as	a	responsibility.
Our	analysis	resulted	in	86	“responsibilities”	across	all	policies	
(see	the	appendix	S1	in	the	Supporting	Information	online).	We	
merged	those	that	were	semantically	similar,	leaving	a	final	set	of	
68	distinct	responsibilities.	The	next	step	was	to	identify	those	that	
applied	specifically	to	citizens,	as	opposed	to	those	embraced	by	
governments	themselves	or	assigned	to	organizations,	educational	
authorities,	or	researchers.
Some	responsibilities	are	mentioned	by	all	the	policies:	secure	
government	systems	(G9),	invest	in	security	(G1,	M4),	
keep	up	with	emergent	threats	(G5),	increase	the	number	of	
people	skilled	in	cyber	security	(S1),	ensure	that	organizations	
adopt	secure	behaviors	(M2)	and	improve	security	awareness	
(S2,	S6).	This	confirms	responsibilities	mentioned	by	Norris	
et	al.	(2017,	2018,	2019).	Yet	only	a	handful	of	statements	
specifically	refer	to	citizens,	the	main	beneficiaries	being	
organizations	and	governments	(S1,	S5,	S6,	S7,	S12).
Question 2: To Whom Are Responsibilities Assigned?
Evaluation	of	the	policies	from	the	Five	Eyes	countries	
and	China	revealed	that	governments	mention	many	
responsibilities,	including	dealing	with	cyber	criminals	(M1),	
protecting	government	infrastructures	(G9),	and	strengthening	
international	collaboration	with	other	countries	in	enhancing	
global	cybercrime	management	(G7).	While	these	actions	are	
crucial,	citizens	and	organizations	are	as	vulnerable	to	attack	as	
government	systems—perhaps	even	more	so.
The	purpose	of	this	analysis	was	to	reveal	what	governments	
believe	the	responsibilities	of	individual	citizens	to	be	and	to	
identify	the	direct	support	that	governments	provide	to	their	
citizens.	In	theory,	government	support	can	range	from	relatively	
low	intervention,	such	as	the	provision	of	advice,	or	providing	
their	citizens	with	the	tools	and	assistance	to	protect	themselves	
in	the	cyber	domain	(Assaf	2008).	Even	if	governments	do	not	
“own”	specific	responsibilities,	they	could	exercise	a	slightly	
reduced	measure	of	intervention	by	monitoring	responsibility-
related	behaviors.	This	possibility	is	mentioned	when	it	comes	to	
organizations	(M2,	M4),	but	monitoring	citizen	actions	in	the	
cyber	realm	is	only	mentioned	in	the	Chinese	policy	(M5,	M6,	
M7,	M8).	The	responsibilities	mentioned	by	other	countries,	
related	specifically	to	citizens,	include	public	awareness	campaigns	
(S14),	provision	of	advice	(S2),	providing	tools	(S19),	and	
encouraging	reporting	of	crimes	(V3).	This	is	a	manifestation	of	
a	typical	responsibilization	stance.	Indeed,	the	Australian	policy	
includes	this	statement:	“We	are	all	responsible	for	our	own	
activities	in	cyberspace,	including	being	aware	of	the	risks	and	
how	to	protect	ourselves	and	those	who	we	are	connected	to”	
(Australian	Government	2016,	23).
Figure	2	shows	the	number	of	responsibilities,	for	each	country,	in	
each	of	these	intervention	categories.	The	anticipated	differences	
between	China	and	the	other	countries	is	indeed	apparent.4
Figure	3	shows	the	intervention	stance	applied	to	citizens	on	the	
government	intervention	scale.
Question 3: What Assumptions Have Been Made?
Based	on	the	analysis,	and	focusing	on	what	the	policies	say	about	
citizens,	most	Five	Eyes	governments	offer	advice	and	expect	
citizens	to	take	care	of	themselves	when	it	comes	to	resisting	cyber	
attacks	and	to	report	attacks	(voluntarily)	when	these	occur.	The	
core	assumptions	of	this	responsibilization	approach	are	that	people	
will	(1)	gain	access	to	this	advice,	(2)	understand	the	need	to	heed	
it	and	trust	it,	(3)	act	on	the	advice	and/or	be	able	to	utilize	the	
provided	tools,	and	(4)	report	attacks.	Whether	or	not	evidence	
exists	for	the	viability	of	these	assumptions	warrants	further	debate.
Assumption 1:	The	problem	with	cyber	advice	is	that	there	is	no	
obvious	route	by	which	such	advice	can	be	delivered,	reliably,	to	
every	citizen	(Okuku,	Renaud,	and	Valeriano	2015).	Certainly,	
some	people	may	seek	advice,	but	many	turn	to	Google	(Renaud	
Figure 2 Countries’ Cumulative Responsibilities, Ranging 
from Maximum Intervention (Government) to Minimal 
Intervention (Voluntary)
Figure 3 Governments’ Intervention Stances for Citizen Cyber 
Threat Management
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and	Weir	2016)	or	rely	on	a	family	friend	(Poole	et	al.	2009).	
As	a	consequence,	they	may	not	receive	accurate	advice	or	be	
so	bewildered	by	the	sheer	amount	of	advice	that	they	give	up	
altogether	(Bawden	and	Robinson	2009).	In	summary,	there	is	no	
guarantee	that	any	individual	will	become	aware	of	high	value	cyber	
security	good	practice	advice.
Assumption 2:	Risk	perceptions	do	indeed	predict	adoption	of	
precautionary	cyber	security	behaviors	(van	Schaik	et	al.	2018).	
However,	facts	and	knowledge,	on	their	own,	do	not	reliably	lead	to	
accurate	risk	perceptions	(Cross	1998;	Pidgeon	et	al.	1992)	because	
risk	perception	is	both	objective	(fact	based)	and	subjective	(socially	
constructed	and	emotional)	(Hansson	2010).	While	facts	might	
well	make	an	impact,	they	could	easily	be	overridden	by	subjective	
aspects,	which	could	lead	to	the	recipient	rejecting	the	import	of	the	
facts.
Assumption 3:	Even	if	citizens	are	exposed	to	the	requisite	cyber	
security	knowledge	and	decide	to	take	notice	of	it,	it	cannot	
be	taken	for	granted	that	they	will	act	on	that	knowledge	
(Campbell	2012;	de	Neufville	1987;	Geller,	Erickson,	and	
Buttram	1983;	Holcomb	et	al.	2009).	People	rely	on	heuristics,	
feelings,	biases,	and	emotional	reasoning	when	acting	on	knowledge	
(Gigerenzer	and	Gaissmaier	2011).	Information	may	guide	
decisions	to	act,	but	this	link	is	by	no	means	certain	or	reliable.	
There	is	evidence	for	this	tendency	in	cyber	security	(Bada	and	
Sasse	2014).
Assumption 4:	The	final	assumption	is	that	people	will	report	
attacks,	but	the	evidence	suggests	that	this	is	not	happening	at	
present	(Mills	2017).	Moreover,	this	also	assumes	that	people	
will	know	they	have	been	attacked	when,	as	Norris	et	al.	(2019)	
point	out,	even	local	governments	do	not	always	know	that	this	
has	happened.	Citizens	cannot	be	expected	to	have	a	great	deal	of	
expertise	and	it	is	likely	that	they	sometimes	will	not	even	know	that	
their	device	has	been	compromised.
Given	the	fact	that	the	four	underlying	assumptions	stated	at	the	
beginning	of	this	section	are	unsupported,	the	responsibilization	of	
citizens,	when	it	comes	to	the	cyber	security	of	their	information	
and	devices,	seems	unrealistic.
Question 4: How Has This Responsibilization Stance 
Come About?
One	explanation	for	what	we	found	is	the	natural	shift	in	neoliberal	
countries	in	the	twenty-first	century.	In	these	countries,	it	has	
become	implicitly	accepted	that	individuals	should	be	responsible	
for	their	own	choices	and	the	consequences	of	those	choices.	
This	responsibilization	renders	citizens	individually	responsible	
for	a	task	that	might	previously	have	been	the	responsibility	of	
some	government	agency	(Wakefield	and	Fleming	2008).	Over	
recent	decades,	responsibility	has	indeed	been	shifted	from	many	
governments	to	individuals	in	a	variety	of	areas	(Comack	and	
Peter	2005).	Citizens	are	advised	on	what	actions	to	take,	made	
responsible	for	the	actions	they	choose	to	take,	and	then	must	
accept	the	outcomes,	good	or	bad.	The	message,	and	government	
agenda,	is	that	“whether	it	is	the	labor	market,	retirement,	health	
care	or	crime,	individuals	are	activated	and	encouraged	to	take	care	
of	themselves”	(Biebricher	2011,	472).	There	is	much	evidence	
that	many	Western	governments	responsibilize	their	citizens,	
holding	them	responsible	for	becoming	the	victims	of	crime	
(Grubb	and	Turner	2012),	their	own	unemployment	(Biebricher	
2011;	Harding	1985),	their	safety	(Gray	2009),	community	crime	
(Skinns	2003),	and	even	border	control	(Koskela	2011).	Avigur-
Eshel	(2018)	points	out	that	individuals	have	even	been	blamed	for	
social	problems	such	as	inequality	and	the	instability	of	the	financial	
system	(citing	Finlayson	2009;	OECD	2009).	Cyber	security	
responsibilization	extends	this	approach	to	a	new	domain.
Another	possible	explanation	is	that	cyber	security,	with	its	cyber	
“criminals”	and	mention	of	“attacks”	and	“securing”	of	devices,	
creates	parallels	in	the	minds	of	policy	makers	with	security	in	the	
physical	realm.	This	duality	might	have	led	governments	to	apply	
the	same	solutions	to	the	virtual	world	as	those	that	have	become	
entrenched	in	the	physical	world.	Householders	are	expected	to	
secure	their	personal	dwellings	and	properties	and	it	might	be	
assumed	that	they	can	do	the	same	when	it	comes	to	cyber	security.
A	third	explanation	is	alluded	to	in	a	statement	by	General	Michael	
Hayden,	former	director	of	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency:	
“Rarely	has	something	been	so	important	and	so	talked	about	with	
less	clarity	and	less	apparent	understanding	[than	cyber	security].	
.	.	.	I	have	sat	in	very	small	group	meetings	in	Washington.	.	.	
unable	(along	with	my	colleagues)	to	decide	on	a	course	of	action	
because	we	lacked	a	clear	picture	of	the	long-term	legal	and	policy	
implications	of	any	decision	we	might	make”	(Hayden	2011,	3).	
The	argument	is	that	the	newness	of	this	domain	prevents	clear-
sighted	and	effective	decision-making	in	terms	of	how	best	to	
manage	the	threats	and	has	led	to	unrealistic	expectations	of	citizen	
capabilities.
A	complicated	phenomenon,	such	as	responsibilization,	is	unlikely	
to	have	a	single	causative,	and	a	full	exploration	of	causes,	while	
important	and	worthy	of	investigation,	is	off	topic	for	this	article.
Questions 5 and 6: How Could the Intervention Stance 
Be Questioned/Thought about Differently?
The	fact	that	governments	are	responsibilizing	their	citizens	when	
it	comes	to	cyber	security	seems	to	be	just	another	instance	of	
governmental	responsibilization	of	citizens,	reminiscent	of	using	
what	has	worked	before,	without	contemplating	that	the	context	
might	render	the	usual	approach	inappropriate	(Bednar	and	
Page	2018).	Responsibilization	has	not	seen	unqualified	success	
in	other	areas	(Avigur-Eshel	2018;	Phoenix	and	Kelly	2013;	
Rossiter	2012;	Soneryd	and	Uggla	2015;	Stol,	Schermer,	and	
Asscher	2016),	notably	in	those	domains	where	building	capability	
is	rather	more	challenging	than	anticipated	(e.g.,	health,	finance,	
and	drug	abuse).	Renaud	et	al.	(2018)	suggest	that	responsibilizing	
cyber	security	is	ill	advised	and	that	more	should	be	done	to	support	
citizens	and	organizations	in	resisting	cyber	attacks.	They	argue	
that	cyber	threats	are	currently	managed	by	governments	as	if	they	
are	a	solo	risk,	whereas	they	ought	to	be	managed	similar	to	the	
way	other	contagious	and	calamitous	risks	are	managed,	due	to	the	
epidemiology	of	cyber	attacks	and	the	expertise	required	to	mitigate	
them.
Analysis	of	the	cyber	security	strategy	policies	of	the	six	countries	
included	in	this	study	revealed	that	the	Five	Eyes	governments	
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relegate	the	responsibility	for	protection	from	cyber	attacks	to	their	
individual	citizens.	Government	efforts	are	often	concentrated	on	
the	protection	of	their	own	information	infrastructure	and	assets	
(G9),	cybercrime	prevention	and	deterrence	(M1),	managing	
and	mitigating	threats	(G5),	and	strengthening	international	
cooperation	(G7).	However,	they	rarely	focus	on	directly	supporting	
citizens	to	combat	identity	theft	or	coping	with	the	consequences	
of	ransomware,	fraud,	and	other	cybercrimes.	Changes	in	
government	strategies	are	needed	to	more	equitably	and	realistically	
allocate	responsibilities	and	to	provide	more	substantial	support	
to	individuals	and	entities	in	carrying	out	their	cyber	security	
related	activities.	In	other	domains,	such	as	the	treatment	of	sex	
offenders	(Adam	2012),	the	Belgian	government,	for	one,	has	now	
de-responsibilized	this	activity.	It	seems	time	for	us	to	reevaluate	the	
cyber-related	responsibilization	of	citizens	too.
As	global	populations	increasingly	connect	to	the	internet,	the	
implementation	and	ongoing	management	of	governance	structures	
and	policy	is	garnering	attention	and	deliberation	from	citizens,	
much	like	health	and	education	reforms.	Governments	must	
embrace	their	roles	and	confront	the	myriad	of	challenges	that	come	
from	a	shared	responsibility	to	diminish	cyber	security	risks	for	
everyone.
The	Five	Eyes	countries	apply	a	responsibilization	agenda,	while	
China	exercises	a	measure	of	control	by	monitoring	citizen	
behaviors	and	expecting	good	online	citizenship.	It	is	unlikely	that	
citizens	of	the	Five	Eyes	countries	would	accept	such	monitoring	
of	their	devices	and	online	activities,	given	the	cultural	differences	
between	the	countries	(Kharlamov	and	Pogrebna	2019).	Moreover,	
Chang,	Zhong,	and	Grabosky	(2018)	suggest	that	it	is	essential	for	
citizens	to	be	partners	in	the	fight	against	cyber	crime.	The	question	
is,	“how	do	we	achieve	this?”	One	approach	worth	considering,	
which	does	not	require	ratcheting	up	intervention	and	monitoring,	
is	suggested	by	Ahrens	and	Rudolph	(2006,	207),	which	aims	to	
“create	capabilities	of	both	public	and	private	stakeholders.”	Their	
approach	is	built	on	four	governance	dimensions:	predictability,	
transparency,	participation,	and	accountability.	They	argue	that	
“governance	structure	is	effective	and	market-enhancing	if	it	ensures	
that	government	policies	are	properly	implemented,	that	private	
businesses	can	thrive	within	a	given	legal	and	regulatory	framework	
and	that	the	adaptive	efficiency	of	both	the	polity	and	the	economy	
is	enhanced”	(Ahrens	and	Rudolph	2006,	212).	Ahrens	and	
Rudolph	explain	that	accountability	constitutes	an	agreement	
on	roles	and	responsibilities	of	organizations	and	individuals.	It	
also	entails	reporting	on	the	actions	taken.	This	makes	it	possible	
for	stakeholders	to	ensure	that	their	views	and	needs	have	been	
considered	and	that	performance	is	adequate.	Participation	requires	
all	stakeholders	to	be	involved	in	the	policy-making	process	so	that	
the	services	they	deem	essential	are	provided.	Transparency	goes	
hand	in	hand	with	accountability,	and	can	encourage	participation	
of	stakeholders.	Predictability	requires	actions	to	be	formulated	in	a	
rule-based	fashion,	binding	public	officials	and	private	actors.	Such	
rules	make	it	possible	for	community	expectations	to	be	established,	
understood,	accepted,	and	managed.
The	way	governments	are	currently	supporting	individuals	does	
not	always	satisfy	these	principles.	For	example,	some	governments	
have	been	criticized	by	privacy	advocates	over	recent	years	for	a	lack	
of	transparency	and	accountability	for	their	actions	in	cyberspace	
(Grabianowski	2007;	Landau	2020;	Liberty	2018).	Moreover,	as	we	
report,	there	is	no	widely	adopted	set	of	roles	and	responsibilities	
in	this	space	(de	Bruijn	and	Janssen	2017),	which	the	predictability	
principle	requires.	A	perusal	of	the	policies	also	suggests	that	
while	industry	and	academia	have	fed	into	the	formulation	of	
the	policies,	the	voices	of	individual	citizens	have	been	given	less	
prominence,	as	evidenced	by	the	paltry	support	they	receive.	A	
new	dispensation,	based	on	Ahrens	and	Rudolph’s	principles	from	
disaster	management,	is	worth	considering.
Challenges in Implementing Policies
Despite	the	ubiquity	of	devices	that	connect	individuals	not	
only	to	each	other	but	across	society	at	large,	cyber	security	
remains	an	underdeveloped	topic	of	research.	This	applies	from	
the	perspective	not	only	of	public	administration	but	also	of	
the	creation,	implementation,	and	ongoing	management	of	
governance	structures	and	policy.	The	swift	adoption	of	Internet-
of-Things	devices,	connected	to,	and	communicating	across,	the	
internet,	is	set	to	exceed	the	impact	of	the	internet	itself	(Shrouf	
and	Miragliotta	2015),	only	raising	the	stakes	for	governments,	
organizations,	and	individuals	in	what	has	become	the	ever-pressing	
task	of	staying	vigilant	and	secure.	Moreover,	vying	for	and	obtaining	
the	resources	to	ensure	that	information	and	communication	systems	
remain	secure	has	remained	a	task	not	to	be	taken	for	granted.	
This	is	evidenced	in	the	(Deloitte-NASCIO	2014)	Cyber	security	
study,	citing	a	budget-strategy	disconnect	apparent	in	many	state	
governments	that	leads	to	inadequate	allocation	of	funds	to	cyber	
budgets.	That	finding	readily	expresses	the	challenge	faced	in	
articulating	the	seriousness	of	the	cyber	threat	as	it	exists	today.	In	
fact,	communicating	the	criticality	of	risks	posed	by	cyber	threats		
(de	Bruijn	and	Janssen	2017)	is	likely	to	be	as	demanding	as	
uncovering	and	mitigating	the	actual	security	problem.
It	is	imperative	that	elected	officials	and	policy	makers	come	to	
understand	the	potential	economic	and	societal	impact	of	cyber	
security	breaches.	In	addition	to	the	impact	on	the	individual	
citizen—often	left	to	their	own	devices	to	protect	themselves	from	
cybercrime—the	“issue	of	security	is	not	limited	to	the	executive	
power,	but	is	also	relevant	to	political	parties,	energy	infrastructure	
providers,	water	boards,	road	management,	ministries,	administrative	
organizations,	NGOs	and	even	sporting	organizations”	(de	Bruijn	
and	Janssen	2017,	1).	Cyber	security	breach	data	and	subsequent	
analyses	suggest	that	financial	outlays	for	security	breach	remediation	
are	increasing.	According	to	the	Global	Cost	of	Data	Breach	Study	
(Ponemon	2018),	the	cost,	on	average,	to	remediate	a	data	breach	
increased	6.4	percent	over	the	previous	year	to	$3.86	million,	while	
the	average	cost	for	each	compromised	record	containing	sensitive	
and	confidential	information	also	increased	by	4.8	percent	year-over-
year	to	$148.	In	addition,	consider	a	report	from	the	Identity	Theft	
Resource	Center	(CyberScout	2016),	which	notes	that,	beyond	the	
rising	costs	for	remediation,	breaches	are	occurring	at	a	markedly	
higher	rate,	with	estimates	of	year-on-year	increases	of	40	percent,	
with	nearly	a	third	being	public	sector	entities.
Conclusion and Future Work
This	article	commenced	by	asking	what	intervention	stances	
governments	adopt	in	supporting	individual	citizens	managing	their	
personal	cyber	risk.	Analysis	of	the	cyber	security	strategy	policies	
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revealed	low	levels	of	Five	Eyes’	government	intervention,	in	stark	
contrast	with	the	greater	levels	of	support	offered	to	organizations	
and	funding	research	endeavors.	Five	Eyes	citizens	are	effectively	
left	to	secure	their	own	devices	and	repel	the	efforts	of	myriad	cyber	
criminals	across	the	globe,	armed	only	with	accurate	advice	that	
they	may	not	find	and	not	be	able	to	follow,	even	if	they	do	obtain	
and	understand	it.	There	is	more	monitoring	of	citizens	in	China,	
but	the	level	of	support	is	not	markedly	different	from	that	in	the	
Five	Eyes	countries.
Evidence	exists	that	a	responsibilization	approach	is	not	particularly	
effective	in	this	domain:	individuals	are	being	hacked	and	suffering	
negative	consequences,	with	no	signs	that	attacks	are	abating.	Most	
governments	focus	on	catching	and	prosecuting	cyber	criminals.	
While	this	strategy	works	well	in	the	physical	world	for	other	types	
of	crimes,	it	must	be	noted	that	the	cyber	security	world	does	not	
mirror	the	physical	world.	Nye	(2011,	21)	points	out	that	“actors	
are	diverse,	sometimes	anonymous,	physical	distance	is	immaterial,	
and	offense	is	often	cheap.”	Cyber	criminals	across	the	globe	
can,	and	do,	target	people	without	requiring	physical	proximity.	
If	one	person’s	device	is	compromised	by	a	cyber	criminal,	the	
exploit	could	spread	to	all	their	connections.	Physical	crime	does	
not	necessarily	exhibit	this	epidemiological	characteristic.	Finally,	
individuals	are	very	knowledgeable	about	securing	their	physical	
belongings	and	themselves,	because	mankind	has	been	doing	this	
for	thousands	of	years.	Yet	relatively	few	citizens	have	mastered	the	
skills	required	to	secure	their	devices	and	online	accounts.	Thus,	
governments	need	to	do	more	to	protect	their	citizens	from	cyber	
attacks.	New	Zealand’s	policy	(New	Zealand	Government	2018)	
mentions	providing	cyber-related	tools	to	their	citizens,	a	welcome	
step	in	this	direction.
Development	of	a	feasible	plan	for	de-responsibilizing	citizens	is	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	article,	but	offers	several	avenues	for	future	
research.	Two	endeavors	are	worth	mentioning.	The	first,	by	the	
Israeli	government,	is	the	establishment	of	a	Cyber-Hotline	for	
people	to	report	being	hacked	and	to	receive	help	with	solutions	
(Williams	2019).	The	second	is	what	the	British	call	“Cyberhood	
Watch,”	which	suggests	training	people	to	help	others	in	their	
communities	with	their	cyber	problems	(Carpani	2019).	Future	
research	efforts	should	also	explore	the	degree	to	which	governments	
have	incorporated	various	factors	and	models	into	their	cyber	
security	policy	formation	processes.	Specifically,	are	considerations	
of	shared	costs	and	benefits—public	goods	or	shared	public	costs—
considered	when	citizens	are	asked	to	take	their	own	responsibility	
for	cyber	security	management?	More	generally,	how	and	why	
do	governments	choose	their	respective	policy	stances	around	
individual	citizens’	cyber	security?
We	believe	that	governments	who	have	not	yet	envisaged	these	
kinds	of	solutions	should	reconsider	whether	their	current	stance,	
and	the	effective	cyber	responsibilization	of	their	citizens,	is	indeed	
appropriate	(Renaud	et	al.	2018).	Our	investigation,	in	revealing	
the	responsibilization	stances,	should	impact	future	research	in	
public	administration.
Notes
1.	 Christou	(2017)	notes	that	a	significant	portion	of	the	work	highlights	efforts	in	
the	United	States,	fewer	do	so	in	the	European	Union,	but	with	no	agreed	upon	
inclusive	theoretical	framework.	Recognizing	the	fluidity	of	the	cyber	world,	
Christou	acknowledges	cyber	power	as	a	predominant	driver	for	contextualizing	
approaches	to	cyber	security	and	offers	a	brief,	but	thorough,	summary	of	
literature	focused	on	a	subsequent	handful	of	approaches	utilized	to	bring	clarity	
to	cyber	governance	and	policy	development.
2.	 International	Telecommunication	Union,	https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/
Cybersecurity/Pages/global-cyber	security-index.aspx.
3.	 See	National	Cyber	Security	Index	2018	at	https://ega.ee/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/ncsi_digital_smaller.pdf	and	http://www.cac.gov.cn/2016-
12/27/c_1120195926.htm	(accessed	April	5,	2020).
4.	 This	analysis	focused	on	the	national	cybersecurity	policy	documents	issued	at	
the	highest	level	of	government.	We	acknowledge	that	a	different	level	of	
intervention	could	be	detailed	within	other	agency	level	documents,	which	is	
likely	to	be	the	case	in	the	United	States.	While	a	review	of	agency	level	
documents	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study,	this	type	of	analysis	presents	a	
fruitful	avenue	for	future	research.
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